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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
logical harmony, inferred from the reasonable interpretation of the
words, acts, or acquiescence of the parties.
CHILTON J. ESTES, '28.
THE TEXAS BOND CASE
Probably no other recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court has been the source of such widespread discussion among the
public generally, as has the Texas Bond Case.1 Of late, numerous
noonhour discussions in financial and legal circles have been devoted
to this decision. Much if not all of the adverse criticism seems to be
due to a lick of understanding of the powers of administrative tri-
bunals, of the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to a lack of knowledge of the pertinent facts in the
case as set forth in Mr. justice Butler's opinion.
The suit was filed in the United States District Court, northern
district, of Texas, to enjoin the sale of a bond issue of $300,000.00
for the purpose of paving and improving of roads, and to enjoin the
levy of taxes on the property of the complainants. The issue presented
was the constitutionality of the Texas statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The act was upheld in the district court2 and the com-
plainant took an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, under section
238 of the judicial Code.
The preliminary acts and the levy of taxes on the complainants'
land, were had under the Complete Texas Statutes of 1920, articles
627 and 628, which provide, "Any county . . . . or any political
subaivision or defined district, now or hereafter to be described and
defined, of a county," is authorized to issue bonds, not to exceed one-
fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property in the district,
for the construction of roads. (Article 627.) "Upon the petition of 50
resident property taxpaying voters of any defined district of any coun-
ty. it is the duty of the commissioners' court to order an election in the
district, as described in the petition to determine whether its bonds
shall be issued for such road purposes, and whether a tax shall be
levied upon the property of the district for their payment. (Arti-
cle 628.)
Sections 631, 634, and 637, further provide. "If two-thirds of the
1. Browning et al. vs. Hooper et al., U. S. 46 Sup. Ct. 141.
2. 3 Fed. (2nd) 160.
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votes cast are in favor of the proposition, the commissioners' court is
required to issue and sell the bonds." (Article 631.) "But before they
are put on the market, the court is required to levy a tax sufficient
to pay the debt as it matures." (Article 634.) "For the purposes of
the act, any district accepting its provisions by such vote is thereby
created a body corporate which may sue and be sued." (Article 637.)
The complainants' land aggregated about 25,000 acres, all in the
extreme northeast portion of Archer County. Their location with re-
spect to the roads sought to be improved was such that no benefit and
a possible detriment would result from the proposed expenditures.
In January, 1924, a petition containing 74 names was presented
to the county commissioners, and requested an election pursuant to the
provisions of the statute. The election was duly held and a majority
vote cast in favor of the bond issue. A large part of the favorable
votes came from Archer City, about the center of the county, where
the roads in question converge. Practically all of the votes in the com-
plainants' section of the county were unfavorable to the issue.
The road district which proposed to issue the bonds embraced
approximately the north half of Archer County. For the purposes of
electing county commissioners, the county was divided into four pre-
cincts, the road district thus including the two precincts of the northern
half of the county. Although in existence some time, it will here be
noted that these precincts were unincorporated; were not established
by the legislature, but by the county board solely for the purpose of
electing commissioners-one from each precinct. The precincts had no
connection whatever with taxation, and had received no legislative
sanction or recognition in any connection.
Under Article 637 (d.) of the Texas statutes, a legal inclusion of
the complainants' land in the proposed district, would prevent creating
a further district for the improvement of roads within the time for
maturity of all the presently proposed issue of bonds; in this case 30
years.
Following the presentation of the petition, the commissioners'
court (one county judge and four commissioners) by order, described
the district's boundaries, determined that the proceeds from the sale of
bonds, if voted, should be expended for the roads in question; declared
the district a body corporate; then ordered the election, which resulted
in practically a 3 to 1 vote in favor of the issue.
The District Court held, in effect, that the Texas statutes and
proceedings thereunder provided the essentials of due process and that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss4/5
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the issue of bonds and the levy of taxes were therefore valid.3 This
was reversed by the Supreme Court.4 An abstract of the opinion
follows.
I.
Funds for the building of roads are obtainable by either general
taxes or special assessments. R. R. vs. Road DistrictY The proceed-
ings in question cannot be sustained as a general tax. An entirely dif-
ferent section of the State statutes empowered the levying of a gen-
eral tax up to a stated maximum per $100 valuation. Money so raised
was not limited, as here, to any specific roads. The reason and purpose
of the levy in question was special. "It is clear that the burdens here
sought to be imposed on the appellants' lands are special assessments
for local improvements," citing Embree v. Road District,6 and R. R. v.
Decature.
7
II.
The road district, the tax levy and amount were not in this in-
stance fixed by the legislature. The act in question does not require
a road district thereunder to conform to any political subdivision. Noth-
ing therein governs the action or choice of those framing and signing
the petition. The commissioners cannot modify nor deny it, but are
bound by the petition, by the decisions in Texas tinder the Act. Hug-
gins v. Vaden ;8 Meurer v. Hooper9 If the required vote is cast, the
commissioners must levy on the property within the district sufficient
to provide the required amount. As to what took place in the instant
case. it is enough to say that the Texas courts had held that a mere
political subdivision of a county. defined by a county board, as here,
is not a "defined district" within the meaning of the Act. The Legis-
lature had not defined it. It is not a body corporate.
Clearly the amount of the bonds to be issued, and the property
to be taxed-and by these the burden is determined-were in no way
defined by the legislature. The difficulty is not that the legislature
lacked this power (Valley Farms v. Westchester1 0 ). but that it was
not here exercised by the Legislature. The idea had its origin in the
minds of the private citizens, the petitioners; they present the scheme
to the county board, and under the statutes the latter cannot exercise
discretion but must proceed. "The requirement that the burden shall
be so spread is not a legislative assessment."
3. 3 Fed. (2nd) 160. 7. 174 U. S. 190.
4. U. S. 46 Sun. Ct. 141. 8. 253 S. W. 877 (Tex. Civ. App.).
5. 266 U. S. 187. 9. 271 S. W. 172.
6. 240 U. S. 242. 10. 261 U. S. 155.
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III.
A tax burden may be determined by the Legislature as to the
local improvement territory, or a municipality having legislative power
over the property may apportion, and property owners cannot, of con-
stitutional right, be heard to object. (Valley Farms Case, supra; Han-
cock v. Muskogee ;" Withnell v. Construction Co.;"2 Wight v. Police
jury 3 cited.) But such is not the present case. When we find no legis-
lative determination as to the burden, due process requires notice and
opportunity for hearing on the question of the benefit to the property
owners. Complainants were denied all opportunity to be heard. There
was no means, no tribunal, empowered to hear them and exercise dis-
cretion as to the benefits derived. The Act was thus declared to violate
the due process of law requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Embree v. Road District, supra, cited.)
The decision and the grounds for it, as set forth in Mr. Justice
Butler's opinion, are of course unquestionable. The court, however,
seems to have almost ignored several points touched on in the briefs of
counsel, especially on the motion for a rehearing. Some of these may
be of interest in future litigation, particularly points relating to the
essential differences between general property taxes and special assess-
ments.
The only Missouri case cited in the opinion of the court is that of
Withnell v. Construction Company,14 supra. This case came before the
court when officials of the City of St. Louis, acting under the authority
of the charter, made without notice, assessments for street improve-
ments. Since the charter had been adopted by a vote of the people,
under the authority of the State constitution, it was held that the
assessment was made under the authority of an act which was legisla-
tive in character and that notice was not necessary. This is in perfect
harmony with prevailing decisions and is authority for the proposition
that where the legislative power has been vested in a subordinate
agency by the organic law, the assessments of such agency do not
require notice to the property owner to render them valid.
FORREST M. HEMKER, '27.
11. 250 U. S. 454.
12. 249 U. S. 63.
13. 264 Fed. 705.
14. 249 U. S. 63.
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